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 Audit Quality and Accrual Persistence: 
Evidence from the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is two-fold: first, to examine whether the quality of 
accruals, as measured by accrual persistence, improved in the post-SOX period, and second, to 
examine the degree to which SOX-related improvement in accrual persistence varies across 
companies depending on the degree of their auditor’s independence. 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper compares accrual persistence in the pre- and post-
SOX periods to test the first question.  Then, partitioning on relative client importance as a 
measure of auditor independence, the paper compares the SOX-based improvement for clients of 
low and high independence audit firms. 
Findings – The study first demonstrates that accrual persistence increased significantly in the 
post-SOX period. The study also finds evidence that in the post-SOX period, the subsample of 
companies audited by Big-N auditors with lower-independence experienced the greatest 
improvement in accrual persistence. 
Originality/value – This is the first paper to evaluate SOX-related improvements in the quality 
of earnings as measured by accrual persistence.  Prior studies test abnormal accruals and other 
earnings management metrics, however, persistence is a more general test of financial statement 
quality.  This study also is the first to compare SOX-related improvements for clients of firms 
with differing levels of independence. 
Keywords Sarbanes-Oxley, audit quality, auditor independence, accruals, persistence 
Paper type Research paper 
 
 1.  Introduction 
A series of events occurred in the period after 2001 that potentially had the effect of 
improving the quality of reported financial information. Following the “dot-com” bust, a number 
of high-profile audit failures (e.g., Enron and WorldCom), the prosecution and subsequent 
demise of Arthur Andersen, and the passage of landmark regulatory legislation in the form of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter, SOX) created both de facto and de jure changes in the 
financial reporting environment.  In this study, we address two research questions. First, did the 
quality of accruals (measured by accrual persistence) improve in the post-2001 period (hereafter, 
the post-SOX period)?  Second, if accrual quality improved in the post-SOX period, did this 
improvement vary depending on the level of pre-SOX auditor independence?   
The first question, dealing with the SOX-era environment, is somewhat controversial 
with divided views among the public, corporate management, auditors, and government leaders. 
Business leaders have been outspoken in their criticism of SOX, asserting that compliance added 
significant costs for minimal benefits. Many have been quick to dismiss SOX as unnecessary and 
overly burdensome, even going so far as to deem it “quack corporate governance” (Romano 
2005).  Concurrent research finds that opportunistic earnings management, proxied using 
absolute levels of abnormal accruals, declined in the post-SOX period (Carcello, Hollingsworth, 
and Mastrolia 2009; Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2008; and Lobo and Zhou 2006).  This behavior was 
accompanied in the post-SOX period by a reduced propensity of reported earnings to just meet or 
beat analysts' forecasts (Bartov and Cohen 2009), potentially indicating companies are less likely 
to engage in opportunistic earnings management. However, Cohen et al. (2008) and Bartov and 
Cohen (2009) find a concurrent increase in the use of real earnings management techniques to 
adjust reported financial statement balances after the passage of SOX. They note that these 
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techniques are more costly to implement, yet less likely to be considered opportunistic if 
detected by investors and auditors.   These findings raise the possibility that in the post-SOX 
period companies may be merely shifting to less detectable earnings management techniques 
rather than reducing earnings management per se. 
In this study, unlike the prior published studies, we are interested in SOX-related 
improvements in accrual quality in general and not specifically a reduction or shifting in 
opportunistic earnings management. We measure relative accrual quality by estimating the 
persistence of total accruals. Total accruals include short-term, long-term, and financial accruals, 
providing a broader approach than one using just operating accruals, allowing an extension to the 
prior literature dominated by abnormal accrual metrics.   
Prior accounting research has often used earnings persistence as a proxy for earnings 
quality (e.g., Beneish and Vargus 2002 and Richardson 2003).  The conceptual basis for this link 
is an argument that higher quality earnings are those that are more sustainable (see Revsine et al. 
1999, pp. 224-225 and Bodie et al. 2002, p. 628).  Earnings and accrual persistence are a 
measure of the degree to which current earnings or accruals are sustained in the future.  Schipper 
and Vincent (2003) argue that earnings persistence can be an indicator of decision usefulness—
the predominant quality characteristic advocated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board.  
Prior research has also linked higher earnings persistence to higher investor response to earnings 
information (Kormendi and Lipe 1987).  Investors place a higher valuation multiple on earnings 
that are expected to persist in the future.  In this sense, investors judge more persistent earnings 
to be of higher quality.   
Measuring accrual quality using persistence also takes a broader view of the sources of 
lower quality including both intentional (opportunistic and real) manipulation and unintentional 
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measurement error in accruals.  This approach allows us to examine the full complement of 
decision choices available for management regarding their response to SOX era reforms. 
Our second question examines potential differences in the effect of SOX-era reforms on 
reporting quality, depending on the level of auditor independence.  Recent studies have raised 
concerns regarding auditors’ incentives with respect to management’s reporting decisions.  The 
prior literature, which focused on audit-quality measures that imply auditor competence, may not 
provide evidence on the negative effect of impaired independence on financial reporting quality, 
even in the presence of auditor ability.  The inconsistent evidence (some report reduced, other 
report increased, abnormal accruals) from the literature examining the influence of non-audit 
service fees on auditor independence is indicative of this (DeFond, Raghunandan, and 
Subramanyam 2002; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 2002; Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 
2003; Krishnan, Sami, and Zhang 2005; Francis and Ke 2006).  Prior studies have examined 
audit quality in the pre-SOX (Lim and Tan 2008) and post-SOX (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009) periods separately.  To our knowledge we are the first to compare 
the effects of SOX depending on the level of auditor independence.1  
We construct a sample of audit-client companies over two time periods:  1998 through 
2001 comprising the pre-SOX period and 2003 through 2006 comprising the post-SOX period.  
This sample is composed of 18,451 company-years audited by Big-N audit firms.2 We first 
examine the persistence of accruals in the pre- and post-SOX periods by comparing accrual 
persistence in each period, with controls for a variety of non-SOX drivers of accrual persistence. 
                                                 
1 Lobo et al. (2006) find that companies with weaker corporate governance experienced greater improvement due to SOX than 
companies with stronger governance.   
2 We use the term “Big-N” to represent audit firms generally included in the Big-6, Big-5, and Big-4 during the years of our 
sample period. This includes Arthur Andersen, Ernst & Young, Pricewaterhousecoopers (PriceWaterhouse and Coopers and 
Lybrand pre 1998), Deloitte, and KPMG.  Prior research (e.g., Reynolds and Francis 2001) likewise limit their investigation to 
only Big-N firms.  
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We find that accrual persistence is significantly higher in the post-SOX period. This finding is 
consistent with a SOX era-related increase in accrual quality.   
 We then partition the entire sample of audit-client companies into high- and low-auditor-
independence groups based on a measure of audit-firm independence used in prior literature 
(e.g., Reynolds and Francis 2001).  We compare accrual persistence across this partition. We 
then test if the post-SOX improvement in accrual persistence differs between our auditor 
independence groups. We expect significantly greater SOX-related improvement in accrual 
persistence for low-independence groups, compared to high-independence groups. We base this 
expectation on the intended effects of the various SOX-era reforms as well as the general 
reporting environment in the post-SOX period. As expected, we find that the post-SOX 
improvement is significantly greater for the low independence sub-samples when compared to 
the high independence groups.   
 This study contributes to the SOX and audit-quality literatures in a number of ways. First, 
we demonstrate a link between SOX-era reforms and higher accrual persistence for Big-N 
audited companies. This is consistent with prior literature that measures accrual quality using 
abnormal accruals only.3  Second, we provide evidence that SOX-related improvements in 
accrual persistence varies by level of auditor independence. The greatest SOX-related 
improvements occur for clients with less independent auditors pre-SOX.  This provides some 
evidence that an objective that motivated the passage of SOX, improving auditor independence, 
was achieved, when measured using our metric for financial statement quality, accrual 
persistence. 
                                                 
3 Concurrent research using data from the post-SOX period indicates that improvements in internal controls, potentially 
motivated by Section 404 disclosures of material weakness in the system of internal controls over financial reporting (e.g., 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009) and executive certification of financial statements (Carcello et al. 2009), lead to reduced abnormal 
accruals.  Our research extends this result by contemporaneously examining the pre- and post-SOX periods and a broader 
measure of financial statement quality, accrual persistence. 
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We note, that like many other empirical studies that investigate the impact of SOX era 
reforms (Carcello et al. 2009; Cohen et al. 2008; Lobo and Zhou 2006) that we cannot 
definitively state that the changes we document in financial reporting behavior are solely from 
the passage of SOX and the other changes in the auditing environment in that period.  Many 
other factors (e.g., increased auditor and investor prudence) were in a state of fluctuation during 
the post SOX period that might influence decisions affected reported financial statements. 
 We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 contains background discussion and 
hypothesis development. Section 3 contains the sample selection process and reports descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 contains research design and results for tests of the effect of the post-SOX 
period on accrual persistence. Section 5 contains research design, results, and sensitivity analyses 
for the tests of the effect of audit quality on accrual persistence and tests of whether SOX-related 
improvement in persistence depends on audit quality. Section 6 contains concluding comments. 
2.  Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) led to dramatic changes to existing audit and 
financial reporting regulations (e.g., Sections 302 and 404), with the intention of improving the 
quality of audited financial statements and the quality of auditing services. In addition, the 
auditing environment appears to have changed dramatically during the period that SOX was 
enacted and implemented (McConnell and Banks 2003; Koehn and Del Vecchio 2004; Ciesielski 
and Weirich 2006).  A variety of related contemporaneous events such as increased audit fees, 
the demise of Arthur Andersen, and greater public scrutiny of auditors and public companies 
served to potentially increase the independence of auditors and the quality of reported accruals.  
While many question the benefits of SOX (Romano 2005), existing research indicates that SOX 
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era reforms have affected managerial decision-making in general (Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2005; 
Cohen et al. 2008), and more specifically with regard to using abnormal accruals to adjust 
financial statement presentation (Carcello et al. 2009; Cohen et al. 2008; and Lobo and Zhou 
2006). To extend this research we investigate the influence of the SOX era on financial reporting 
quality by examining the persistence of reported accruals, a more complete measure of accrual 
quality.  Based on prior research, we expect the persistence of accruals to improve in the post-
SOX period when compared to the period before the implementation of SOX. Stated formally: 
H1. The persistence of accruals will be significantly greater in the post-SOX period 
compared to the pre-SOX period.  
 Note, however,  that Cohen et al. (2008) and Bartov and Cohen (2009) find the use of real 
earnings management techniques to alter reported financial statement balances increased after 
the passage of SOX.  This provides an alternative outcome for H1.  If real earnings management 
activity substitutes for prior use of abnormal accruals to opportunistically adjust financial 
statement balances then accrual persistence could decrease or remain unchanged in the post-SOX 
period.  Unlike prior studies that compare the level of abnormal accruals before and after SOX, 
by examining accrual persistence, we are able to account for reductions in financial reporting 
quality due to real earnings management activities. 
2.2 Audit quality and the effect of SOX 
It seems reasonable that relative audit quality will influence the degree to which the 
events surrounding and following enactment of SOX affected accrual quality. One would expect 
that companies that received high quality audits before the SOX period would see less 
improvement in financial reporting quality due to SOX-era reforms than companies with lower 
quality audits.  This should be particularly true for audit quality issues directly targeted by the 
SOX reforms, such as auditor independence.   
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A quality audit occurs when a skilled and independent audit firm is able to identify 
accounting misstatements and exert pressure on the client to correct those misstatements 
(DeAngelo 1981). As a result of reducing accounting misstatements, the audited financial 
statements exhibit higher quality.  However, as a practical matter, the achievement of this ideal 
depends both on the competence of the auditor to find accounting misstatements, and on the 
firm’s willingness to exercise its influence over the client to correct misstatements. DeAngelo 
(1981) suggests the client-auditor association is a bilateral monopoly that motivates auditors to 
compromise their independence in order to retain clients. Therefore, if a particular client 
represents a large proportion of an audit firm’s total revenue, the audit firm may be less willing 
to exert influence on client reporting choices (Reynolds and Francis, 2001; Francis and Yu, 
2009). Ghosh, Kallapur, and Moon (2009) find evidence that suggest investors are concerned 
about perceived auditor independence, measured as a reduced earnings response coefficient, 
using audit fees as a proxy for the level of a client’s importance to the auditing firm.  
Based on prior research investigating settings where auditors obtain a significant 
proportion of audit revenues from one client, we suggest that auditor independence is potentially 
impaired and auditor willingness to correct misstatements is diminished. In this setting, the audit 
firm's desire to retain a client that represents a significant economic asset for the firm, leads to 
reduced auditor independence (Reynolds & Francis 2001).  
 In order to indicate auditor independence, we use a measure of the proportion of the total 
office-specific audit fees earned from a particular audit client.  This measure of client influence 
is estimated by the ratio of the client’s audit fees to the total audit fees earned by the audit firm in 
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the same office.4 Specifically, a high (low) influence measures indicate potentially impaired 
(unimpaired) auditor independence.5 
There are several reasons to suggest that client specific influence is related to client-
specific independence and audit reporting decisions.  First, for clients that represent a significant 
amount of a firm-office’s audit-fee revenue, firms will tend to act in a way that preserves that 
revenue.  This idea was suggested by the Cohen Commission Report which states "When one or 
a few large clients supply a significant portion of the total fees of a public accounting firm, the 
firm will have greater difficulty in maintaining its independence." (AICPA, 1978).   
Firms with significant revenues from individual clients are likely to have the competence 
to identify general and industry-specific misstatements.  However, impaired independence due to 
the economic pressures of retaining this client may reduce the firm’s willingness to influence the 
client to correct the misstatements.  The result of uncorrected accounting misstatements would be 
audited accruals with lower quality. 
As mentioned earlier, many of the provisions of SOX were directed toward improving audit 
quality by increasing auditor independence, specifically the ban on non-audit services and the 
implementation of a direct communication channel with the audit committee allowing auditors to 
bypass management in their discussions of potentially contentious financial reporting and control 
issues. In the post-SOX era, the audit committee hires the audit firm, not company management 
or the Board of Directors. Therefore, the effect of SOX may be to improve the independence of 
audit firms. As previously discussed, the SOX era reforms had dramatic effects on the auditing 
marketplace. The provisions of SOX were intended to improve the quality of all audits. 
                                                 
4Audit fees are often proxied using client size in prior research (Simunic 1980).  We adopt this proxy as well because for much of 
our sample period audit fee data is not available from Audit Analytics. 
5 Note that this does not imply that the competence of the auditor is lacking, just their willingness to adjust financial reports for 
misstatements. . 
 9 
However, we expect this effect to be greater for audits performed by less independent audit 
firms.  If SOX encourages all firms to reach the same audit quality level, these firms will have 
more room for improvement. We investigate this question by testing whether the SOX-related 
improvement is greater for companies with auditors with lower levels of independence. Stated 
formally:   
H2. Reported accruals audited by firms with lower levels of independence will have a 
greater increase in persistence from the pre-SOX to the post-SOX periods than 
those audited by audit firms with higher levels of independence. 
3.  Data and Sample Selection 
 We first obtain data from the 2006 and 2007 COMPUSTAT databases over the data years 
1997 through 2007. All NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ companies with available industry information 
(COMPUSTAT item “DNUM”), audit-firm information (Compustat item 149), and total sales 
(item 12) in these data years are included in the calculation of proxies for auditor independence 
and audit-firm industry specialization. We limit our sample to Big-N firms to be consistent with 
prior literature using similar metrics to determine auditor independence and specialization. 
Because actual audit fee data has limited availability for the pre-SOX period, we use the client 
company-year’s total sales (natural log) to proxy for audit revenue (Reynolds and Francis 2001).  
We calculate the natural log form of total sales by industry, by auditor, by city, by auditor within 
industries and by auditor within cities. 
 We form a dichotomous variable, IND, designed to measure audit-firm independence.  
We construct IND by calculating an influence measure used in prior research, first by Reynolds 
and Francis (2001).  This measure (INFLUENCE), calculated for each client/auditor 
combination, is the company’s sales divided by the sum of sales of each publicly-listed company 
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audited by an audit firm office.6  We use the natural log of sales in our calculations given its high 
correlation with actual audit fees (Craswell et al., 1995; Simunic 1980) which were not publicly 
available during some of our sample years.  This allows us to determine the economic 
importance of a client based on the proportional magnitude of its fees relative to total fees of the 
publicly traded companies audited by an individual audit firm office. 
 Prior studies indicate that actual audit fees paid to (or, in the case of our proxy, the total 
client sales audited by) an auditor is a reliable measure for auditor reliance, or economic 
dependence, on a client or particular industry (Simunic 1984; Reynolds & Francis 2001; Chung 
& Kallapur 2003). We define a high (low) independence audit firm as one that has an 
INFLUENCE measure in the lower three (top) quartiles.  IND is coded one when INFLUENCE 
is in the lower three quartiles indicating unimpaired independence, whereas  IND is coded zero 
when INFLUENCE is in the top quartile, indicating potentially impaired independence.  
To control for audit firm specialization, we construct a control variable for industry 
specialization (SPEC) as follows. We first calculate the audit firm’s share of the company-year’s 
two-digit SIC industry (e.g., Audit Firm A audited 26% of total company sales in two-digit SIC 
industry 50 in 1999). Following Palmrose (1986, p 104), we define industry specialists as audit 
firms that have a market share of at least 120 percent of an equal division of market share among 
the Big N firms existing at that time. Specifically, when the audit firm’s market share is greater 
than 1/6*1.2 (20%) for 1997, 1/5*1.2 (24%) for 1998-2000, or 1/4*1.2 (30%) for 2003-2006, 
SPEC is coded one, and zero otherwise. This method has the advantage that it controls for the 
consolidation of the Big N firms from six in 1997 to four in 2002.  To ensure that the relationship 
between audit firm and client-company is well established at the beginning of the fiscal year, we 
                                                 
6 We base our estimate of audit-firm office-specific fee revenue by totaling estimated audit fees earned in a single metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA) which should be a good approximation of the service area of an individual audit-firm office. 
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assign each company-year the SPEC, metric calculated for that company’s auditor in the prior 
fiscal year.7 
 We then screen sample company-years for required financial statement data in the prior, 
current and subsequent years. Earnings is equal to income before extraordinary items 
(COMPUSTAT item 18), scaled by average total assets (item 6). Total accruals (TACC) is equal 
to the change in total assets (item 6), minus the change in cash and short-term investments (item 
1), plus the change in short-term investments (item 193), minus the changes in total liabilities 
(item 181) and preferred stock (item 130), all scaled by average total assets (item 6). Cash flows 
(CF) is equal to Earnings, less TACC. 
 In order to construct an unambiguous test of the relative accrual quality between groups 
of companies and between the pre- and post-SOX periods using accrual persistence coefficients, 
it will be important to control for other determinants of accrual persistence that may 
systematically differ across groups of companies and across time.8  Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
discuss a number of company-specific characteristics that are likely to be associated with accrual 
persistence, likely to be affected by contemporaneous events, but unrelated to the effect of SOX 
or the role of auditors in detecting reporting errors and misstatements.  Based on their study, we 
define six variables designed to control for company-specific characteristics and 
contemporaneous events that may affect accrual persistence. First, company-years with different 
operating cycles are more likely to have differing accrual persistence. OPCYCLE is the sample 
                                                 
7 An additional benefit of using lagged audit quality is that is provides some assurance that the direction of causation is from 
audit quality to accrual persistence and not the reverse. 
8 Since sample company-years experienced both SOX and contemporaneous events simultaneously, and the events affected all 
companies in the economy simultaneously, it is not possible to control for a particular contemporaneous event itself, such as the 
9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent recession.  However, it is possible to control for the effect of those unrelated 
contemporaneous events on reported accruals. 
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company’s operating cycle, in days. Following Dechow and Dichev (2002), OPCYCLE is 
calculated as follows: 
 ܱܲܥܻܥܮܧ ൌ ቂሺ஺ோ೟ା஺ோ೟షభሻ ଶ⁄ௌ௔௟௘௦ ଷ଺଴⁄ ቃ ൅ ቂ
ሺூ௡௩೟ାூ௡௩೟షభሻ ଶ⁄
஼ைீௌ ଷ଺଴⁄ ቃ (1) 
Where AR is accounts receivable (COMPUSTAT item 151), Inv is inventory (item 3), and COGS 
is cost of goods sold (item 41). Second, smaller companies are more likely to have lower accrual 
persistence compared to larger companies that have more stable and diversified operations. SIZE 
is equal to the square root of total assets (this measure of company size is aligned with our proxy 
for audit fees). Third, company-years with greater sales volatility are likely to have lower accrual 
persistence. SVOL measures volatility in reported sales. SVOL is the standard deviation of sales 
(item 12) scaled by average total assets (item 6) over four years. Fourth, and for the same 
reasons, company-years with greater cash flow volatility are likely to have lower accrual 
persistence. CFVOL measures the volatility of cash flows; it is equal to the standard deviation of 
operating cash flows (item 308) scaled by total assets. Finally, company-years reporting losses 
are likely experiencing a severe negative shock in their operating environment. Accruals made in 
response to these conditions likely involve lower accrual persistence. LOSS is a dummy variable 
coded one if Earnings is less than zero and coded zero otherwise. Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
find evidence that each of these characteristics, to varying degrees, is associated with accrual 
quality.9  In addition to the characteristics suggested by Dechow and Dichev, we expect that a 
company’s relative riskiness may affect the persistence of their accruals. Therefore, we will also 
control for book-to-market ratio as a general measure of company-specific risk (Fama and 
French 1993). BM is equal to book-to-market ratio at fiscal-year-end. 
                                                 
9 Dechow and Dichev (2002) identify three additional variables that affect accrual quality: accrual volatility, earnings volatility, 
and accrual magnitude. We do not control for these variables because, unlike the variables we adopt, they measure characteristics 
of accruals themselves rather than non-accrual characteristics that might affect accruals persistence. Including these three 
variables would inappropriately control for the hypothesized relations; this would amount to “throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater.” 
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 Overall, our data requirements yield a sample of 18,451 company-years, representing 
4,439 companies, over the periods 1998 through 2001 and 2003 through 2006. Yearly 
subsamples range from 1,516 in 2006 to 2,793 in 1999.10 
 Table I, panel A contains distributional statistics for the study variables. The mean 
(median) company’s earnings represent -1.8 (3.5) percent of total assets, while mean (median) 
total accruals equal 4.0 (3.1) percent of assets. Mean Earnings are slightly negative, reflecting 
the skewing effects of extreme negative observations. Mean IND of 0.793 indicates that 79.3 
percent of sample companies are audited by independent audit firms.  In the same way, mean 
SPEC of 0.272 indicates that 27.2 percent of the sample companies are audited by industry 
specialists. Mean LOSS of 0.300 means that 30.0 percent of the sample companies reported 
negative net income. 
 Table I, panel B contains variable means calculated in the pre- and post-SOX period. CF 
and TACC are not significantly different in the pre- and post-SOX periods, while Earnings are 
significantly higher in the post-SOX period. IND is significantly higher in the post-SOX period 
(0.748 versus 0.855, t = 11.29); however, the economic significance of that difference is 
questionable. Each of the mean control variables is significantly different in the post-SOX 
period. These significant differences reinforce the importance of controlling for these company-
specific characteristics in our regressions. 
 Table II contains Pearson and Spearman correlations between the study variables, along 
with p-values in parentheses. Pearson correlations are reported above the diagonal and Spearman 
below. Most of the correlations are statistically significant, but very low. The correlations 
between Earnings in period t+1 and both CF and TACC are positive, as expected. This is 
                                                 
10 These sample sizes are calculated after removing observations judged to be excessively influential based on large HAT 
variables (greater than 0.007) generated from estimating the two regression models described below. Including some or all of 
these outliers causes great instability in estimated coefficients. 
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consistent with prior studies that find both CF and TACC reflect positive persistence with respect 
to one-year-ahead earnings (e.g., Sloan 1996). Consistent with prior research and with the role of 
accruals, the correlation between CF and TACC is significantly negative. As expected, IND and 
SPEC are negatively correlated, indicating the importance of controlling for industry 
specialization using SPEC. Not surprisingly, LOSS is negatively correlated with one-year-ahead 
Earnings, CF, and TACC. LOSS is also negatively correlated with SIZE. Cash flow volatility, 
CFVOL, is negatively correlated with CF and positively correlated with LOSS. SIZE is 
negatively correlated with both cash flow and sales volatility, which confirms our intuition that 
larger firms will have less volatile economic environments. 
4.  Tests of the effect of SOX on accrual persistence 
4.1 Research design 
 We test H1 by estimating a pooled regression of one-year-ahead Earnings on current CF 
and TACC, with separate coefficients estimated pre-SOX and post-SOX for audit clients.  We 
then compare the pre- and post-SOX accrual persistence coefficients. We expect the persistence 
of accruals will be greater in the post-SOX period for both sets of companies. 
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The dummy variable Dpre is equal to one if the year equals 1998 through 2001, and zero 
otherwise. Similarly, Dpost is equal to one if the year equals 2003 through 2006, and zero 
otherwise. As described in the previous section, accrual persistence can differ between firms due 
to economic factors that may systematically differ in the pre- and post-SOX periods. Therefore, 
we include six control variables that interact with TACC to control for non-SOX-related 
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persistence differences.11  Based on Dechow and Dichev (2002), we would expect the coefficient 
on the SIZE interaction to be positive, while the other five control-variable coefficients would be 
negative. However, because a number of these control variables are correlated with one another, 
these univariate predictions may not hold; therefore, no formal predictions are made about the 
direction or magnitude of the control-variable coefficients. 
 The CF coefficients  postpre 11 and  measure the persistence of cash flows with respect 
to one-year-ahead Earnings. Similarly, the TACC coefficients  postpre 22  and  measure the 
persistence of accruals. H1 will be supported if prepost 22    .  
4.2 Results 
 Table III reports the results from estimating regression (2). The table reports two versions 
of this regression; the first set of results excludes the control variables while the second set 
includes them. The post-SOX accrual coefficient ( post2 ) is significantly greater than the pre-
SOX coefficient ( pre2 ) in both the uncontrolled and controlled versions of the regression (t-
statistics of 3.78 and 3.44, respectively).12  This finding supports H1; the persistence of accruals 
significantly increased in the post-SOX period, compared to the pre-SOX period, after 
controlling for other sources of differential persistence.13 
                                                 
11 We do not include a control for SPEC in this regression because its purpose is to control for industry specialization when using 
the IND variable which is not used in regression (2). We convert the five continuous control variables to fractional ranks before 
interacting them with TACC. Using fractional ranks (that range from zero to one) allow interpretation of the interaction 
coefficients as incremental persistence coefficients. 
12 The study sample may contain up to 15 company-year observations from a single company. Correlations between these 
observations violate independence assumptions of OLS. In addition, the sample is significantly heteroskedastic (χ2 = 406.19, p < 
0.0001). Therefore, the t-statistics reported in Table III, and the rest of the study, are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and for 
lack of within-company independence in the study sample. These Huber-White t-statistics are calculated based on Diggle et al. 
(1994).  In untabulated results described in the sensitivity analysis section, we re-estimated our t-statistics simultaneously 
controlling for non-independence both within companies and within years (i.e., two-way clustering).  All inferences are 
unchanged using this more strict control for non-independence. 
13 Interestingly, the cash flow coefficient is also significantly greater in the post-SOX period compared to the pre-SOX period. 
This implies that economic conditions in the post-SOX period caused cash flow persistence to increase. This raises the question 
of whether the same economic conditions caused the increase in accruals persistence rather than the hypothesized improvement 
in reporting quality. We test the significance of the difference between the improvement in accrual and cash flow persistence for 
 16 
We next examine the efficacy of our control variables. In the uncontrolled regression, the 
coefficients on TACC are smaller than the CF coefficients. This is consistent with the results in 
prior studies, particularly Sloan (1996) and Richardson et al. (2005). This difference reverses 
when we add the control variables to the regression. This is not surprising because these 
variables are controlling for the economic factors that cause the persistence of accruals to be 
lower than that of cash flows. Five of the six control variables have statistically significant 
coefficients. Only SIZE has a coefficient in the opposite direction expected. 
5.  Audit quality, accrual persistence, and the effect of SOX 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Table IV reports comparative means across the IND groups. The differences in mean 
Earnings, SPEC, LOSS, CFVOL, SVOL, OPCYCLE and SIZE are significantly different for the 
two IND groups. The significant differences in the control variable means in each of the panels 
demonstrate the importance of controlling for these economic drivers of accrual persistence 
when comparing accrual persistence across IND groups. 
5.2 Research design 
 We estimate the following pooled regression to measure the effect of IND on accrual 
persistence separately in the pre- and post-SOX periods. 
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the controlled regression. The improvement in accrual persistence is significantly greater than the improvement in cash flow 
persistence (0.056, , t-statistic = 2.18). This should not be the case if the improvement in the persistence of each comes from the 
same economic cause. 
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 Regression (3) once again tests for differences in accrual persistence in the pre- and post-
SOX periods.  The addition of interaction variables for auditor independence allows separate 
tests for companies audited by high- and low-independence auditors.  The coefficients on the 
interaction IND × TACC  ( pre3 and post3 ) measure the incremental accrual persistence for the 
high-IND groups, compared to the low groups  The coefficients on TACC ( pre2 and post2 ) can be 
interpreted as accrual persistence for the low-IND group.  The difference prepost 22    measures 
the SOX-related improvement in accrual persistence for the companies audited by low-
independence auditors. Similarly, the difference    postpostprepre 3232    measures the SOX-
related improvement in accrual persistence for companies audited by high-independence 
auditors.  We can re-test H1 separately for low-independence and high-independence groups by 
testing these coefficient differences. 
 We test H2 by comparing the difference in the improvement in accrual persistence, due to 
SOX, between the low- and high-IND groups; we test    preprepostpostprepost 323222   . 
5.3 Results 
 Table V reports the results of estimating regression (3). We first report the results from 
re-testing H1 separately for the low-independence and high-independence groups.  H1 is 
supported for both groups (0.212 and 0.107, t-statistics = 5.20 and 3.09, respectively).  These 
results demonstrate the robustness of the H1 test reported for regression (2).  
H2 predicts that the SOX-related improvement in accrual persistence will be significantly 
greater for the low-IND group compared to the high-IND group. We find significant support for 
H2, with the low-IND increase in persistence being 0.105 (t-statistic = 2.43) greater than the 
high-IND increase in persistence.  These results are consistent with significantly greater SOX-
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related improvement in accrual quality for clients of audit firms classified as low-independence 
firms.  
 Overall, the results from estimating regressions (2) and (3) provide evidence that the 
quality of accruals improved in the post-SOX period, but occurs disproportionately in companies 
audited by audit firms with potentially impaired independence in the pre-SOX period. These 
results are consistent with the intentions stated in SOX of improving the quality of audits and 
increasing the quality of financial reporting. 
5.4 Sensitivity analyses 
We consider a number of additional analyses to further understand the scope of the 
results reported above.  We first examine whether our results are driven by sample companies 
switching between Big-N and non Big-N audit firms.  During the period in which SOX was 
being implemented, significant market changes were occurring that resulted in a large number of 
former Big-N clients moving to non Big-N auditors.  We re-estimate both regression (2) and 
regression (3) for the subsample of companies that did not switch between Big-N and non Big-N 
auditors during the years 1997 through 2007.  In no case are the inferences using this restricted 
sample different from those reported in Table III and V.  Therefore, our main analysis is 
supported for this subsample. 
We next consider whether the relationship between material weakness disclosures 
required under Sections 302 and 404 of SOX and abnormal accruals discussed in prior and 
concurrent research (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009, see additional citations in footnote three) 
is the main explanation for our results.  To test the degree to which the presence or the 
remediation of reported material weaknesses are driving our results, we exclude observations 
from companies that reported a material weakness adverse opinion in any year.  This results in a 
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sample size of 16,397 observations.  The inferences from these analyses are the same as in our 
main results.  Therefore, we conclude that our main results are not primarily driven by the 
presence or remediation of material weaknesses identified in post-SOX period.   
 We next examine the sensitivity of our results to an alternate method of calculating our t-
statistics.  In our primary analyses we report Huber-White t-statistics that control for correlations 
between observations from the same company across years.  However, the standard errors on 
which our t-statistics are based may be biased downward due to cross-correlations between 
observations within the same fiscal year.  In order to control for cross correlation within years 
and within companies, it is necessary to simultaneously control for clustering on both 
dimensions.  We examine the effect on our hypothesis tests of potential within-year cross-
correlation by re-estimating each of our hypothesis tests using standard errors that control for 
both within-year and within-company correlations.14  H1 and H2 are similar to the reported tests 
(H1: t=5.04, H2: t=2.74). 
 We next re-test H1 by estimating the volatility of residuals produced by estimating 
regression (3). We estimate residual volatilities in a manner similar to Dechow and Dichev 
(2002).  Company-specific standard deviations of residuals were estimated separately in the pre- 
and post-SOX period.  In untabulated results, mean residual standard deviations were 
significantly smaller in the post-SOX period compared to the pre-SOX period (t-statistic of 
8.20).  These results are consistent with H1. We then partition the set of company-specific 
standard deviations into those with different audit-firm independence.  The reduction in residual 
                                                 
14 The procedure used to produce these standard errors is suggested in Petersen (2009).  The SAS code we used was written by 
John McInnis and is available at:  http://myweb.uiowa.edu/jmcinnis/sas_code.htm 
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volatility is approximately the same for the low-independence group compared to the high-
independence group.  These results are inconsistent with H2.15 
 We also explored the possibility that the time period we choose is unique and that our 
results would change if other years were selected. Our main analysis uses observations from two 
sets of four years: 1998 through 2001 and 2003 through 2006. This sample includes one 
problematic year, 2001, when the economy felt the effects of 9/11. We repeat our analysis using 
1997 through 2000 as our pre-SOX sample. The results using this alternate sample are essentially 
identical to those reported in Tables III and V. 
 It is also possible that our results could occur because of a change in the composition of 
total accruals rather than because of our hypothesized relations. For example, in the pre-SOX 
period total accruals could be composed of relatively more working-capital accruals and less 
long-term accruals while the opposite is true in the post-SOX period. Such a change in relative 
composition of total accruals could cause an apparent change in the persistence of total accruals 
that is unrelated to SOX. We determine the extent to which this affects our results by re-
estimating equations (2) and (3) using accruals disaggregated into three components:  Working 
capital accruals, non-current operating accruals, and financial accruals. Disaggregating accruals 
in this way should control for changes in the relative composition of total accruals. We find 
support for H1 in all three components.  We find support for H2 in two of the three components.  
We obviously have no predictions in our study of which components of accruals will be more 
affected by audit quality or SOX. However, finding support for our hypotheses for at least one 
component provides evidence that differential accrual composition is not driving our results. 
 
                                                 
15 The measurement of residual volatilities in this method may introduce noise that is driving the lack of support for H2.  Due to 
the fact that our pre- and post-SOX periods are just 4 years each, and to the effects of 4-way partitioning on IND and Pre- versus 
Post, the variances were estimated over as few as two observations for some firms.  
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 Larger companies (those with market capitalization above $70 Million), were required to 
implement the requirements of SOX earlier than smaller companies.  Therefore, one would 
expect the results of our study to be more strongly observed in the large subsample.  Consistent 
with that expectation, H1 is strongly supported for the large accelerated filers, but not for the 
smaller companies.  Interestingly, H2 continues to be supported for both groups, but with 
marginal significance—possibly due to the loss of statistical power because of the partitioning of 
the sample. 
 Finally, we re-estimate our main regressions making a variety of changes in the sample or 
the design.  We re-estimate the regressions after eliminating companies that were ever audited by 
Arthur Andersen, excluded the control for SPEC, and included all main effects for the 
interactions.  In no case were the inferences from our hypothesis tests affected. 
6.  Conclusion 
 In this study we answer two research questions. First, did the quality of accruals improve 
in the post-SOX period?  We find evidence consistent with an improvement in accrual quality in 
the post-SOX period. Second, does the extent of post-SOX improvement in accrual quality differ 
between clients of auditors with low- and high-independence?  We find evidence that companies 
audited by auditors classified as having lower-independence experienced the greatest 
improvement in accrual quality in the post-SOX period. 
 These findings represent a significant extension of prior studies examining possible 
financial reporting benefits from SOX.  Our use of accrual persistence, rather than abnormal 
accruals, to test our hypotheses allowed us to demonstrate a net improvement in financial 
reporting quality, despite the previous findings that real earnings management increased in the 
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post-SOX period.  Prior studies were not designed to allow the effect of higher real earnings 
management to affect their tests of accrual quality. 
 Several potential limitations to the study should be kept in mind when considering our 
results. First, due to lack of actual audit fee data over both the pre- and post-SOX periods, we use 
total sales as a proxy for audit fees. While this and prior studies have demonstrated a high 
correlation between audit fees and total sales, it is possible that our proxy measures audit fees 
with error. Second, since there has been only a short time period since implementation of SOX, 
our post-SOX results may not reflect the long-term effects of the post-SOX environment. Future 
studies can evaluate the generalizability of our results when more years of post-SOX data 
become available.  Finally, the post-SOX period was characterized by a number of changes to 
the economy aside from those affecting the audit environment.  It is possible that despite the 
controls used in our main and supplemental analyses that some other omitted variable is driving 
our results.  A similar limitation is noted in concurrent and prior research investigating the 
influence of SOX era reforms on managements use of abnormal accruals (Carcello et al. 2009; 
Cohen et al. 2008; Lobo and Zhou 2006). 
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Table I 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A:  Distributional Statistics 
  Standard 1st 1st  3rd 99th 
Variable Mean Deviation Percentile Quartile Median Quartile Percentile 
 
Earningst+1 -0.018 0.222 -0.894 -0.027 0.035 0.079 0.280 
TACCt 0.040 0.182 -0.491 -0.026 0.031 0.102 0.641 
CFt -0.051 0.238 -1.008 -0.074 -0.000 0.044 0.339 
INFLUENCEt-1 0.053 0.126 0.001 0.005 0.013 0.039 0.705 
INDt-1 0.793 0.405 0 1 1 1 1 
SPECt-1 0.272 0.445 0 0 0 1 1 
BMt 0.570 9.776 0.015 0.268 0.482 0.806 3.141 
LOSSt 0.300 0.458 0 0 0 1 1 
CFVOLt 0.084 0.258 0.006 0.027 0.049 0.090 0.578 
SVOLt 0.190 0.278 0.008 0.065 0.121 0.226 1.102 
OPCYCLEt 155.720 2,924.109 0.000 59.711 99.167 152.136 481.792 
SIZEt 31.187 39.732 2.706 9.411 18.045 35.900 193.259 
Panel B:  Distributional Statistics Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley  
 Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
 Mean Mean 
Variable (1998 – 2001) (2003 – 2006) Difference t-statistic 
 
Earningst+1 -0.031 0.001 0.032 4.56 
TACC 0.036 0.045 0.009 1.44 
CF -0.053 -0.048 0.005 0.74 
IND 0.748 0.855 0.107 11.29 
SPEC 0.295 0.241 -0.054 -5.39 
BM 0.752 0.317 -0.435 -11.17 
LOSS 0.321 0.272 -0.049 -4.90 
CFVOL 0.094 0.071 -0.023 -3.23 
SVOL 0.214 0.157 -0.058 -7.34 
OPCYCLE 176.675 126.676 -49.999 -67.78 
SIZE 26.908 37.117 10.210 109.50 
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Notes for Table I 
AVASSET = Average total assets (item 6) over year t. 
Earnings = Income before extraordinary items (item 18), scaled by AVASSET. 
TACC = Total accruals, scaled by AVASSET. Total accruals are equal to the change in total assets (item 6), minus the 
change in cash and short-term investments (item 1), plus the change in short-term investments (item 193), 
minus the changes in total liabilities (item 181) and preferred stock (item 130). 
CF = Cash flows; Earnings – TACC 
INFLUENCE = The ratio of the audit fees earned from this client over the total audit fees earned in the audit-firm office. 
IND = Audit firm independence dummy; equal to zero when INFLUENCE is in the top quartile, and equal to one 
otherwise. 
 
SPEC = Audit firm industry specialization dummy; when the audit firm’s share of the company-year’s two-digit SIC 
industry is greater than 1/6*1.2 (20%) for 1997, 1/5*1.2 (25%) for 1998-2000, or 1/4*1.2 (30%) for 2003-2006 
SPEC is coded one, zero otherwise. 
BM = Book-to-market ratio 
LOSS = Dummy variable coded one if Earnings is less than zero, coded zero otherwise. 
CFVOL = Cash flow volatility; the standard deviation of cash flows, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years. 
SVOL = Sales volatility; the standard deviation of sales, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years. 
OPCYCLE = Operating cycle in days;  ቂሺ஺ோ೟ା஺ோ೟షభሻ ଶ⁄ௌ௔௟௘௦ ଷ଺଴⁄ ቃ ൅ ቂ
ሺூ௡௩೟ାூ௡௩೟షభሻ ଶ⁄
஼ைீௌ ଷ଺଴⁄ ቃ 
AR = Accounts receivable (item 151) 
Inv = Inventory (item 3) 
Sales = Sales (item 12) 
COGS = Cost of goods sold (item 41) 
SIZE = Square root of total assets. 
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Table II 
Correlations 
 
 Earnings CF TACC IND SPEC BM LOSS CFVOL SVOL OPCYCLE SIZE 
 
Earnings  0.502 0.132 -0.093 0.033 -0.095 -0.483 -0.198 -0.058 -0.024 0.173 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CF 0.354  -0.530 -0.103 0.048 0.010 -0.386 -0.187 -0.066 -0.010 0.155 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) 
TACC 0.231 -0.527  0.025 -0.007 0.016 -0.251 -0.002 0.030 -0.008 0.008 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.31) (0.03) (0.00) (0.76) (0.00)  (0.28)  (0.25) 
IND -0.052 -0.091 0.027  -0.050 -0.006 0.099 0.059 0.045 0.008 -0.280 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.40)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.28)  (0.00) 
SPEC 0.010 0.040 -0.013 -0.050  0.005 -0.058 -0.040 -0.044 -0.008 0.169 
 (0.15)  (0.00) (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.25)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.30)  (0.00) 
BM -0.229 0.063 -0.179 -0.060 0.062  -0.007 -0.001 0.003 -0.003 -0.008 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.37) (0.88) (0.69) (0.97) (0.27) 
LOSS -0.056 -0.355 -0.325 0.099 -0.058 0.007  0.137 0.065 0.022 -0.208 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.33)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
CFVOL -0.244 -0.254 -0.004 0.173 -0.123 -0.157 0.341  0.148 0.003 -0.111 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.61)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.68)  (0.00) 
SVOL -0.052 -0.103 0.054 0.067 -0.070 -0.012 0.095 0.401  0.008 -0.130 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.09)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.30)  (0.00) 
OPCYCLE 0.000 0.012 -0.035 0.048 -0.042 0.044 0.023 0.069 -0.017  -0.011 
 (0.99) (0.11)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.02)  (0.14) 
SIZE 0.266 0.232 0.050 -0.295 0.162 -0.023 -0.339 -0.540 -0.280 -0.110  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
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Notes for Table II 
Pearson Correlations are reported above the diagonal and Spearman Correlations below the diagonal. Correlation p-values reported in parentheses. 
 
AVASSET = Average total assets (item 6) over year t. 
Earnings = Income before extraordinary items (item 18), scaled by AVASSET. 
TACC = Total accruals, scaled by AVASSET. Total accruals are equal to the change in total assets (item 6), minus the change in cash and short-term investments (item 1), 
plus the change in short-term investments (item 193), minus the changes in total liabilities (item 181) and preferred stock (item 130). 
CF = Cash flows; Earnings – TACC 
INFLUENCE = The ratio of the audit fees earned from this client over the total audit fees earned in the audit-firm office. 
IND = Audit firm independence dummy; equal to zero when INFLUENCE is in the top quartile, and equal to one otherwise. 
 
SPEC = Audit firm industry specialization dummy; when the audit firm’s share of the company-year’s two-digit SIC industry is greater than 1/6*1.2 (20%) for 1989-1997, 
1/5*1.2 (25%) for 1998-2001, or 1/4*1.2 (30%) for 2002-2005 SPEC is coded one, zero otherwise. 
BM = Book-to-market ratio 
LOSS = Dummy variable coded one if Earnings is less than zero, coded zero otherwise. 
CFVOL = Cash flow volatility; the standard deviation of cash flows, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years. 
SVOL = Sales volatility; the standard deviation of sales, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years. 
OPCYCLE = Operating cycle in days;  ቂሺ஺ோ೟ା஺ோ೟షభሻ ଶ⁄ௌ௔௟௘௦ ଷ଺଴⁄ ቃ ൅ ቂ
ሺூ௡௩೟ାூ௡௩೟షభሻ ଶ⁄
஼ைீௌ ଷ଺଴⁄ ቃ 
AR = Accounts receivable (item 151) 
Inv = Inventory (item 3) 
Sales = Sales (item 12) 
COGS = Cost of goods sold (item 41) 
SIZE = Square root of total assets. 
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Table III 
Regressions of one-year-ahead earnings on current cash flow and accruals, with separate 
coefficients for pre- and post-SOX periods 
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 Estimated  Estimated 
Variable Coefficients t-statistics Coefficients t-statistics 
 
Intercept -0.006 -4.87 -0.006 -5.03 
 Pre-Sox: 
 CF  0.757 34.33 0.759 34.24 
 TACC 0.626 26.71 0.841 14.04 
Post-Sox: 
 CF  0.817 33.39 0.817 33.51 
 TACC 0.753 30.76 0.955 16.50 
Controls 
 BM*TACC   -0.089 -1.65 
 LOSS*TACC   -0.005 -0.18 
 CFVOL*TACC   -0.100 -2.21 
 SVOL*TACC   -0.102 -1.89 
 OPCYCLE*TACC   -0.093 -2.22 
 SIZE*TACC   -0.087 -1.79 
 
Adjusted R2 0.47  0.48 
 
Hypothesis test: 
 H1: prepost 22    0.127 3.78*** 0.114 3.44*** 
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Notes for Table III 
Huber-White t-statistics calculated as described in Diggle et al. (1994) 
*** Significant at greater than 0.01; one-tail test 
** Significant at greater than 0.05; one tail test 
 
AVASSET = Average total assets (item 6) over year t. 
Earnings = Income before extraordinary items (item 18), scaled by AVASSET. 
TACC = Total accruals, scaled by AVASSET. Total accruals are equal to the change in total assets (item 6), minus the 
change in cash and short-term investments (item 1), plus the change in short-term investments (item 193), 
minus the changes in total liabilities (item 181) and preferred stock (item 130). 
CF = Cash flows; Earnings – TACC 
Dpre = Dummy variable coded one if year equals 1997 through 2000; zero otherwise. 
Dpost = Dummy variable coded one if year equals 2003 through 2006; zero otherwise. 
 
BM = Book-to-market ratio 
LOSS = Dummy variable coded one if Earnings is less than zero, coded zero otherwise. 
CFVOL = Cash flow volatility; the standard deviation of cash flows, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years. 
SVOL = Sales volatility; the standard deviation of sales, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years. 
OPCYCLE = Operating cycle in days;  ቂሺ஺ோ೟ା஺ோ೟షభሻ ଶ⁄ௌ௔௟௘௦ ଷ଺଴⁄ ቃ ൅ ቂ
ሺூ௡௩೟ାூ௡௩೟షభሻ ଶ⁄
஼ைீௌ ଷ଺଴⁄ ቃ 
AR = Accounts receivable (item 151) 
Inv = Inventory (item 3) 
Sales = Sales (item 12) 
COGS = Cost of goods sold (item 41) 
SIZE = Square root of total assets. 
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Table IV 
Variable means partitioned by IND 
 
Variable IND = 0 IND = 1 Difference t-statistic 
 
Earningst+1 0.023 -0.028 -0.051 -6.04 
TACC 0.031 0.042 0.011 1.44 
CF -0.005 -0.063 -0.058 -6.74 
SPEC 0.316 0.261 -0.054 -4.50 
BM 0.689 0.539 -0.150 -2.78 
LOSS 0.212 0.324 0.112 9.12 
CFVOL 0.055 0.092 0.037 4.13 
SVOL 0.165 0.196 0.03123 3.24 
OPCYCLE 109.879 167.705 57.825 62.14 
SIZE 52.963 25.493 -27.470 -248.59 
 
 
AVASSET = Average total assets (item 6) over year t. 
Earnings = Income before extraordinary items (item 18), scaled by AVASSET. 
TACC = Total accruals, scaled by AVASSET. Total accruals are equal to the change in total assets (item 6), minus the 
change in cash and short-term investments (item 1), plus the change in short-term investments (item 193), 
minus the changes in total liabilities (item 181) and preferred stock (item 130). 
CF = Cash flows; Earnings – TACC 
INFLUENCE = The ratio of the audit fees earned from this client over the total audit fees earned in the audit-firm office. 
IND = Audit firm independence dummy; equal to zero when INFLUENCE is in the top quartile, and equal to one 
otherwise. 
 
SPEC = When the audit firm’s share of the company-year’s two-digit SIC industry is greater than 1/6*1.2 (20%) for 
1989-1997, 1/5*1.2 (25%) for 1998-2001, or 1/4*1.2 (30%) for 2002-2005 SPEC is coded one, zero otherwise. 
BM = Book-to-market ratio 
LOSS = Dummy variable coded one if Earnings is less than zero, coded zero otherwise. 
CFVOL = Cash flow volatility; the standard deviation of cash flows, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years. 
SVOL = Sales volatility; the standard deviation of sales, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years. 
OPCYCLE = Operating cycle in days;  ቂሺ஺ோ೟ା஺ோ೟షభሻ ଶ⁄ௌ௔௟௘௦ ଷ଺଴⁄ ቃ ൅ ቂ
ሺூ௡௩೟ାூ௡௩೟షభሻ ଶ⁄
஼ைீௌ ଷ଺଴⁄ ቃ 
AR = Accounts receivable (item 151) 
Inv = Inventory (item 3) 
Sales = Sales (item 12) 
COGS = Cost of goods sold (item 41) 
SIZE = Square root of total assets. 
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Table V 
Regressions of one-year-ahead earnings on current cash flow and accruals, with separate 
coefficients for pre- and post-SOX periods and IND 
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 Estimated 
Variable (hypothesis test) Coefficients t-statistics 
Intercept -0.006 -5.06 
Pre-Sox: 
 CF  0.759 34.22 
 TACC 0.845 13.95 
 IND*TACC 0.000 0.00 
Post-Sox: 
 CF  0.817 33.47 
 TACC 1.057 17.24 
 IND*TACC -0.105 -3.17 
Controls 
 SPEC*TACC -0.030 -0.81 
 BM*TACC -0.086 -1.57 
 LOSS*TACC -0.006 -0.21 
 CFVOL*TACC -0.097 -2.13 
 SVOL*TACC -0.102 -1.90 
 OPCYCLE*TACC -0.093 -2.23 
 SIZE*TACC -0.086 -1.69 
 
Adjusted R2 0.48 
 
Hypothesis Tests: 
 H1: 
  Low-IND: 
prepost
22    0.212 5.20*** 
  High-IND:    preprepostpost 3232    0.107 3.09*** 
 
 H2:    preprepostpostprepost 323222    0.105 2.43** 
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Notes for Table III 
Huber-White t-statistics calculated as described in Diggle et al. (1994) 
*** Significant at greater than 0.01; one-tail test 
** Significant at greater than 0.05; one tail test 
 
AVASSET = Average total assets (item 6) over year t. 
Earnings = Income before extraordinary items (item 18), scaled by AVASSET. 
TACC = Total accruals, scaled by AVASSET. Total accruals are equal to the change in total assets (item 6), minus the 
change in cash and short-term investments (item 1), plus the change in short-term investments (item 193), 
minus the changes in total liabilities (item 181) and preferred stock (item 130). 
CF = Cash flows; Earnings – TACC 
Dpre = Dummy variable coded one if year equals 1997 through 2000; zero otherwise. 
Dpost = Dummy variable coded one if year equals 2003 through 2006; zero otherwise. 
INFLUENCE = The ratio of the audit fees earned from this client over the total audit fees earned in the audit-firm office. 
IND = Audit firm independence dummy; equal to zero when INFLUENCE is in the top quartile, and equal to one 
otherwise. 
 
SPEC = When the audit firm’s share of the company-year’s two-digit SIC industry is greater than 1/6*1.2 (20%) for 
1989-1997, 1/5*1.2 (25%) for 1998-2001, or 1/4*1.2 (30%) for 2002-2005 SPEC is coded one, zero otherwise. 
BM = Book-to-market ratio 
LOSS = Dummy variable coded one if Earnings is less than zero, coded zero otherwise. 
CFVOL = Cash flow volatility; the standard deviation of cash flows, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years. 
SVOL = Sales volatility; the standard deviation of sales, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years. 
OPCYCLE = Operating cycle in days;  ቂሺ஺ோ೟ା஺ோ೟షభሻ ଶ⁄ௌ௔௟௘௦ ଷ଺଴⁄ ቃ ൅ ቂ
ሺூ௡௩೟ାூ௡௩೟షభሻ ଶ⁄
஼ைீௌ ଷ଺଴⁄ ቃ 
AR = Accounts receivable (item 151) 
Inv = Inventory (item 3) 
Sales = Sales (item 12) 
COGS = Cost of goods sold (item 41) 
SIZE = Square root of total assets. 
